Control and Revolution
(page 2 of 2)
By Victor Wallis
As a more direct expression
of Italy's uniqueness in these respects, one can point at a tradition
dating back to the 1860s which linked socialism very closely with
anarchism. Less than a year before the factory occupations,
Antonio Gramsci gave a clear example of such a link when he wrote:
"The proletarian dictatorship can only be embodied in a type
of organization that is specific to the activity of producers, not
wage-earners, the slaves of capital. The factory council is the
nucleus of this organization.... The factory council is the model
of the proletarian State."
Civil War provided the occasion, in certain regions of the country,
for the closest approach yet made to a society fully based on workers'
control. Largely hidden from world opinion at the time, the innovations
in question have nonetheless been well recorded, often by eye-witnesses,
and they constitute a vital reference-point for any revolutionary
strategy which looks beyond the mere seizure of state power.
The most notable
aspects of the Spanish experience may be summarized as follows.
First, workers' control was practiced in every sector of the economy.
While it went furthest in agriculture, in at least one city (Barcelona)
it was also introduced in all industries and services. Second, the
structural changes were very radical, often entailing the elimination
of certain managerial positions, the equalization of wages, and,
in some peasant collectives, the abolition of money. Particularly
impressive is the fact that, where land-expropriations took place,
the peasants almost invariably preferred communal ownership to parcellization.
Third, even the most radical of the changes were introduced directly
and immediately, placing maximum reliance on the participation of
the masses to the highest level of their abilities. Fourth, contrary
to many stereotypes, the changes in question were not necessarily
made at the expense of efficiency, but instead often involved advances
in technology or coordination, as in the consolidation of the Barcelona
bakeries and the vertical integration of the Catalan lumber industry.
And finally, it was in some places close to three years before the
self-managed operations were suppressed by force of arms. There
was thus ample time for them to prove themselves as practical arrangements.
The full scope
of the mass initiative in Spain was so great that one hesitates
to offer any schematic explanation, but we may at least sketch in
some of the contours. In Spain as in Italy, we find an anarchist
component to working class culture, and we also find a constitutional
political framework. But Spain was economically more backward; its
constitution was newer and its anarchism stronger. Anarchist and
socialist movements had already developed two rival union-federations
by the time the Republic was established (1931). In the sphere of
government the anarchists were naturally unrepresented, but the
left parties doubtless benefited from their votes. By the time of
the February 1936 elections, the general polarization of Spanish
society exceeded that of postwar Italy, and the Popular Front coalition
won a majority in parliament. The workers and peasants could thus
make their first moves under a government which, though not revolutionary,
they had at least some reason to consider their own.
forces, however, provided the real catalyst. This reflected another
unique aspect of the Spanish case. In Italy, as also in Germany,
fascism had intervened only after the high tide of the workers'
movement had already passed--outlasted in the former case by a relatively
unified bourgeoisie; crushed in the latter by an unholy alliance
of social-democrats and generals. In Spain of the 1930s, the bourgeoisie
was still something of a rising class. An important sector of it
was represented in the leadership of the Popular Front: again an
unusual circumstance, in that all previous late-developing bourgeoisies
had carefully avoided any political alliance with the working class.
But the liberalism of the Republican bourgeoisie could not be viewed
even as a temporary expedient by the rest of the Spanish ruling
class. Hence the rapidly improvised military response of Franco
in July 1936--the least prepared of all fascist risings in terms
of any prior pacification of the masses.
from below was instantaneous, massive, and revolutionary. The popular
resistance far outstripped anything that could have been organized
by the bourgeois Republic; but by the same token it involved the
immediate implementation of measures which even the most progressive
of the governing parties could envisage only for a distant future.
The military insurgency had hobbled the Republican power structure,
and in so doing had confronted workers and peasants not only with
a mortal threat, but also with an undreamed-of opportunity. They
rushed to fill the vacuum. In a two-week period they collectivized
industries, services, and farm villages throughout the Eastern half
of Spain. With communities now authentically their own to defend,
they gave themselves in full force to the military struggle against
government was in a contradictory position. On the one hand, it
would have fallen instantly without the popular counterattack, but
on the other, it could in no way identify with the social revolution,
which this involved. So while it gathered some of its forces to
resist Franco's Nationalist army, it mobilized others to suppress
the very movement which had made such resistance possible. It was
to gain a decisive counterrevolutionary success in the Barcelona
May Days of 1937.
from the side of the workers and peasants was ambiguous. Their dilemma
was essentially the obverse of that of the government. While they
were tenacious about preserving their social gains, they were reluctant
to bring about any further deterioration in the unity of the anti-fascist
forces. At any level above that of their immediate communities,
they tended to accept defeat, although this often meant that they
were disarmed for the common military effort. To some extent, however,
this element of resignation had shown itself even while the revolution
was still at the crest of its initial upsurge. A key moment had
occurred in Barcelona on July 21, 1936. The armed workers, having
routed the bourgeoisie, were offered power by the Catalan president.
They declined. As explained by one of their anarchist leaders: "We
could have remained alone, imposed our absolute will, declared the
Generalidad [Catalan state] null and void, and imposed the true
power of the people in its place, but we did not believe in dictatorship
when it was being exercised against us, and we did not want it when
we could exercise it ourselves only at the expense of others."
When one takes
into account the final outcome of the conflict, it is hard not to
consider such a statement either tragic or absurd. But the tragedy/absurdity
is compounded by the position of those who did think in terms of
state power. For while the anarchists backed the workers but refused
to accept their mandate, the Communists welcomed a role in the government
but used it--with even greater insistence than their bourgeois partners--to
undo the revolutionary gains of the workers.
"Eurocommunist" position is not new; already in January
1937 he was saying, as Secretary General of the Socialist-Communist
Youth, "We are not Marxist youth. We fight for a democratic,
parliamentary republic." The practical meaning of such
statements was shown after May 1937, when the Republican government
(with Communist participation) began the systematic restoration
of private ownership in agriculture and inaustry. This was almost
two years before the final victory of fascism.
workers and peasants thus experienced, within the lifetime of the
Republic, a compressed and intensified version of what the Russian
workers went through after 1917. The rationales, however, were different.
Lenin's reservations about self-management had rested above all
on the question of expertise. In Spain, on the other hand, even
for work requiring highly specialized skills, it was possible to
find individuals who accepted the aims and ideals of the masses
of workers, and did not demand special privileges. This is indeed
a tribute to the cultural impact of Spanish anarchism, and it was
an important factor in the improvement of public services under
for suppressing workers' control was found not in any failures of
the workers themselves but rather in the international situation:
an issue that became particularly important with the intervention
of Nazi and Italian Fascist forces on Franco's side. The Soviet
Union was the only outside power willing to aid the Republic, but
Stalin did not wish to jeopardize his defensive alliance with the
French government by supporting revolution in Spain. More generally,
the Communist parties argued that the only hope of additional support
against Franco would come from portraying the battle strictly as
one of "democracy vs. fascism." For our present purposes,
it is enough to make three points about this argument. First, its
assumption that bourgeois governments might be swayed by such an
ideological appeal proved to be totally unfounded. Second, it imposed
a major limitation on the nature of foreign working-class support,
for while thousands of highly politicized workers came to Spain
as volunteers, the millions who stayed at home had no reason to
see the issue as one of class interest and as a result had no significant
impact on the struggle. Finally, within Spain, the consequences
for the workers' and peasants' fighting ability were--as we have
was a direct successor to revolutionary Spain in more ways than
one: electoral stimulus, workers' initiatives, conflicts within
the left, decisive foreign support to the right, and crushing defeat.
In some ways, of course, Chile never reached the levels attained
in Spain. Thus, the Chilean workers and peasants remained for the
most part unarmed, and there were no whole regions of the country
that they controlled. Nevertheless, there is one important sense
in which the Chilean case carries the accumulated experience of
workers' control another step forward: namely, that the interaction
between class-conscious workers and the elected government was a
great deal more fluid. The Allende government, unlike the Popular
Front government in Spain, was made up overwhelmingly of working-class
parties and was at least programmatically committed to workers'
control. The Chilean workers, for their part, had much less of a
tradition of anarchism, and in fact were most often identified--if
only through their unions--with the very parties that made up the
government. Only among the peasants had any direct takeovers been
carried out prior to 1970.
In effect, the
autonomous workers' initiatives were, to a greater extent than in
either Italy or Spain, an offshoot of the struggle that was being
conducted at state level. While the Chilean workers never came as
close to power as did their Spanish predecessors (especially in
Catalonia), they certainly would not have declined the authority
if it had been thrust upon them. Their problem was thus the opposite
of the one facing the Spanish workers: after a whole generation
of functioning under a stable constitutional regime, and after eighteen
years of steady electoral growth for the left, the Chilean workers
had become used to relying upon an eventual electoral success for
the satisfaction of their demands. It was only after Allende's
narrow victory that they began to see the full extent of their own
responsibility in the process.
The direct role
of the workers was initially a defensive one. The first factories
to be taken over were those whose owners had unilaterally cut back
production. The workers did not necessarily expect to run such
factories on their own; their more likely priority, at this stage,
was to protect a government with which they identified. At first,
it was only in the countryside (especially in the Mapuche Indian
zone) that expropriations from below were undertaken on a systematic
basis. But even in these cases, there was a sense of acting within
legal terms consistent with those accepted by Allende, for already
on the books was an agrarian reform passed in 1967 which had set
an 80-hectare ceiling on individual holdings but which the previous
administration had not seriously implemented.
In short, both
workers and peasants acted in the expectation of official support
for their steps. To a greater extent than in any previous case,
such support did materialize. This was not because the government's
security from the right was any stronger, for in this respect, unlike
the situation in Republican Spain, the military still constituted
a threat from within. Rather, it was because the government's dependence
on the left was greater, both in terms of its original access to
office and in terms of its need to confront unanimous bourgeois
obstruction of economic activity. In any case, legal norms were
established through the Ministry of Labor for regulating factory
organization in the "social area" (nationalized sector)
of the economy, and these provided for a majority of worker-elected
representatives on the Administrative Council of each enterprise.
Within this framework, the workers again showed that their economic
performance increased with the level of their participation, while
the latter in turn, far from reflecting narrow sectoral interests
or competitive, attitudes, was related to their identification with
the total process of change.
But the Allende
government was never able to free itself of its institutional moorings.
The bourgeoisie, by its very obstructionism, was forcing a speed-up
of the transformation, but only the grassroots workers could mount
an appropriate response. With the October 1972 bosses' stoppage,
"business as usual" disappeared completely, and expropriation
became necessary not just as a revolutionary goal but simply for
the maintenance of essential services. At this point the contradiction
between legally installed government and class-conscious workers
became decisive. The workers overcame the stoppage and saved the
government, but the government bargained away their victory by agreeing
to return seized factories in exchange for military guarantees to
protect scheduled congressional elections.
alternatives will never be fully known. Significantly, however,
even a strong defender of Allende's concessions admits that the
military at that moment was not yet prepared to launch a successful
coup. From the workers' standpoint, therefore, the setback was
unmitigated. It signaled the end of any official encouragement to
workers' control, except in improvised response to the coup-attempt
of June 1973, when once again many plants were seized. By that time,
however, the military already had the initiative, and from then
on until the final coup in September, workers in self-managed factories
were subjected to systematic shakedowns and intimidation by the
armed forces. The legal pretext for such shakedowns was never applied
against rightists, even though it was they who had actually been
committing acts of violence. The government said nothing, but it
was powerless in any case. It had made its choice earlier. As in
Spain, the workers' initiatives had been blocked "from their
own side"--less wholeheartedly, but no less surely.
had shown that government support for workers' control was at least
Some sectors of the governing coalition (especially the left wing
of the Socialist party) favored just such a strategy, though not
to the exclusion of a coordinated approach to transition. Within
the self-managed factories, the workers with the highest level of
participation had no illusions about the sufficiency of their own
sphere of activity; rather, they identified precisely with these
sectors, and thus with an approach which--even if belatedly--had
come to see the workplace struggle and the state-level struggle
as going hand in hand.
It should hardly
be necessary to say that the struggles for workers' control and
for socialism are inseparable. And yet the problem that has arisen
again and again in practice is that they have found themselves organizationally
in conflict. "Socialism" has been the formal monopoly
of a political party (or parties), while self-management has been
the direct expression of the workers and peasants themselves. Whichever
one has prevailed, the result has been a setback in the movement
toward a classless society. "Socialism" without self-management
has revived or perpetuated rigid social strata, while self-management
without a strong political direction has simply been suppressed.
One can go even
further and can say that the two sets of failures have reinforced
Thus, for every defeated workers' uprising, there are the party
bureaucrats who will gain credibility by denouncing its spontaneous
and undisciplined character. But at the same time, for every disappointment
occasioned by a revolutionary government, there are the radical
libertarians who will add a further blast to their condemnation
of any strategy that doesn't emanate directly and immediately from
the base. Vanguard and mass, party and class: instead of moving
closer together, they move further apart.
On what basis
might this separation be overcome? Among the experiences considered
here, the closest approach to a synthesis was reached in Italy.
But in that case, the revolutionary party was in its earliest formative
period and was quite remote from power. In Chile, there was an improvised
synthesis, but it came only after the working-class parties had
already taken on governmental responsibility under highly restrictive
conditions. The result was that as the workers' initiatives broadened,
the parties' support for them became more and more limited. What
remained of such support in Allende's third year came increasingly
from outside the government. In any case, it was too little and
too late. Russia and Spain, for all their differences, seem in the
end to express a pattern of polarization, which was the trend everywhere.
synthesis between the self-management impulse and a political strategy
has yet to be worked out. If and when it comes, it will be recognizable
only in the form of a sustained practical success. No theoretical
formulation can constitute an answer in itself. Nonetheless, whatever
practical success is attained will have some theoretical anticipation,
and it is in this sense that our four cases, despite their relative
failures, have something to tell us.
One of the biggest
problems is that of technical expertise and coordination. We cannot
say that the workers' ability to solve it has been demonstrated
for any and every situation, but we can say the following. First,
a genuine movement toward self-management, far from stressing a
"my firm first" attitude, leads naturally--and as a practical
matter--toward efforts at mutually beneficial planning between economic
units. While these efforts may initially derive only from immediately
obvious requirements, the practice they entail will create a natural
receptivity to the case for more long-range or "macro"
calculations. Second, workers are both able and willing to learn
about technical matters. Third, where the urgency of expertise exceeds
the time available to diffuse it, it is increasingly possible to
find previously trained professionals (abroad if necessary) who
will accept, perhaps even enthusiastically, new terms for their
services. Finally, looking ahead, we should recognize that technology
itself is not entirely an independent factor. On the contrary, for
environmental as well as political reasons, it may have to undergo
a considerable number of demystifying, simplifying, and decentralizing
A second major
problem-area has to do with the conditions under which revolutionary
workers' control can succeed. We have already noted the immediate
political condition, namely, that the factory-level and state-level
processes come to fruition simultaneously. This is partly a matter
of conscious decisions, about which more will be said in a moment,
but it is also a matter of the economic and cultural characteristics
of the society in question. Regarding this background dimension,
our survey has suggested that there are many possible situations--some
of them even mutually exclusive--which may prove favorable to workers'
control. While the self-management impulse has always been a component
of urban revolutionary movements, it has sometimes--as in Spain--appeared
in even stronger form in rural settings. Within the industrial sector,
it has sometimes been associated with heavy industry (Italy) and
sometimes with light (Spain). Although usually associated with non-dependent
economies, workers' control has also become an issue in Third World
countries (Chile and also Algeria). Within Europe, although the
most radical thrusts have occurred in the relatively less prosperous
countries (Spain, Portugal), the potential for workers' control
continues to grow even in the foremost welfare state (Sweden). Related
to this, if we consider the major political frameworks of military
dictatorship, constitutional democracy, and People's Democracy,
we find self-management initiatives arising in all three (1918 Germany,
1972 Chile, 1968 Czechoslavakia). Finally, there may be considerable
variation in terms of such immediate circumstances as war and peace,
economic crisis, and fascist threats.
All this does
not add up to any theory as to where workers' control is most likely,
but it does tell us that there is no single factor, which automatically
excludes it. The role of conscious choice must therefore be a large
one. Among the objective factors, the only one that clearly facilitates
such a choice is the existence of an established cooperative tradition.
This was something real in many of Spain's rural areas, and the
urban workers were not yet remote from it. The challenge elsewhere,
then, is to develop some equivalent to such a culture while still
relating to immediate political options. The question of leadership,
which this raises, is the final major problem-area that we must
consider. What seems to be needed, in effect, is a revolutionary
party which would give priority to workers' control at every stage
of its development. The difficulty of such a project is already
about workers' control means foregoing a certain type of discipline,
while being seriously revolutionary means taking steps that are
not limited by workplace perceptions. The possibility of meeting
both these requirements is suggested by some of the experiences
we have looked at, but a firm synthesis must be more systematic.
It must recall Marx's emphasis on the work process, his interest
in cooperative forms, and his distrust of "leaders."
Recognizing these facets as having been systematically downplayed
in the Leninist tradition, the new synthesis must accept the importance
of what Gaston Leval calls, concluding his book on Spain, "the
capacity to organize the new society quickly." The latter
process is one which depends not only on thorough preparation but
also on broad human involvement. If a party is needed, it is more
for the movement's self-protection than for any other purpose. The
movement's objectives will alert it to the limits of discipline,
but its history will warn it of the risks of spontaneity.
1. Unless otherwise
specified, the term "workers' control" will be taken as
synonymous with "self-management." Each term may be applied,
depending on context, either to particular workplaces or to an entire
Dallemagne, Autogestion ou dictature du proletariat (Paris, 1976),
3. Yvon Bourdet
and Alain Guillerm, L'Autogestion (Paris, 1975), ch. VII.
4. For two excellent
recent examples, see Jeff Lustig, "On Organization: The Question
Leninist Party," Politics and Society VII (1977-78), 27-67,
and Carl Boggs, "Marxism,
Prefigurative Communism, and the Problem of Workers' Control,"
Radical America XI-XII
(November 1977-February 1978), 99-122.
5. See Scandinavian
Review, special issue on "Industrial Democracy" edited
Peterson (June 1977).
6. On China,
see Barry M. Richman, Industrial Society in Communist China (New
1969), ch. IX: the key body ranking above the director is the party
committee, and "a majority of the enterprises did not have
any workers on their party committees" (p. 762). On
Yugoslavia, see Bourdet and Guillerm, Autogestion, esp. p. 174.
7. It is along
these lines that Jean-Francois Revel tries to dismiss self-management
as a non-existent alternative to social democracy and Stalinism.
La tentation totalitaire (Paris,
1976), pp. 167-74. It should be noted that his remarks on the dynamics
(p. 169) tacitly assume a capitalist environment.
8. See, e.g.,
his expression of support for the factory committees, quoted in
Tony Cliff, Lenin, vol. 2 (London, 1976), p. 244. For background
on this issue, see E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik
Revolution, 1917-1923, vol. 2 (London 1952), pp. 62-79.
9. V.I. Lenin,
"The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government" (April
1918), in Selected
Works. 1-vol. ed. (New York, 1971), p. 424 (Lenin's emphasis).
Brinton, The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control (London, 1970), p.
11. Lenin, "The
Taylor System--Man's Enslavement by the Machine" (March 1914),
Collected Works, vol. 20, pp. 153f. Lenin's criticism refers to
the distribution of labor and of the product rather than to the
way the work is carried out.
12. Voline (V.M.
Eichenbaum), The Unknown Revolution, 1917-1921 (New York, 1975),
13. Lenin, "'Left-Wing'
Childishness and the Petty Bourgeois Mentality" (March 1918),
Selected Works, p. 451.
14. Paul Avrich,
The Russian Anarchists (Princeton, 1967), pp.162f.
The Unknown Revolution, p. 294.
Childishness,” Selected Works, p. 440.
17. Ibid., p.
444 (Lenin's emphasis).
18. Ibid., p.
19. On current
practices, see M. Holubenko, "The Soviet Working Class: Discontent
Opposition," Critique, No. 4 (Spring 1975), esp. p. 23.
arguing along Leninist lines, defends such assumptions on the ground
that production relations have not reached a high enough level to
supersede them (Autogestion
ou dictature, p.122); however, when he comes to the question of
how such a level is to be reached, i.e., specifically, of how the
working class, after its demobilization under bureaucratic rule,
is to be "remobilized" (pp. 248f), all he can offer are
some abstract imperatives.
21. Paolo Spriano,
The Occupation of the Factories: Italy 1920 (London, 1975), pp.
22. Ibid., p.
23. Ibid., p.
Salvemini, The Origins of Fascism in Italy (New York, 1973), p.
25. John M.
Cammett, Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism (Stanford,
1967), p. 117.
26. Ibid., p.
The Occupation, p. 84.
28. Gwyn A.
Williams, Proletarian Order: Antonio Gramsci, Factory Councils,
and the Origins of Italian Communism, 1911-1921 (London, 1975),
pp. 246 f.
Antonio Gramsci, p. 22.
Procacci, Storia degli italiani (Bari, 1971), p. 395.
Gramsci, "Unions and Councils" (October 11, 1919), in
Selections from Political
Writings (1910-1920), ed. Q. Hoare (New York, 1977), p. 100.
32. Based on
Gaston Leval, Collectives in the Spanish Revolution (London, 1975),
and on Sam
Dolgoff (ed.), The Anarchist Collectives: Workers' Self-Management
in the Spanish Revolution, 1936-1939 (Montreal, 1974), esp. chs.
33. Based on
Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth (Cambridge, England, 1950).
Pt. II; Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War,
1931-1939 (Princeton, 1965), ch. 1; and Stanley Payne, The Spanish
Revolution (New York, 1970), ch. 2.
34. Pierre Broue
and Emile Temime, The Revolution and the Civil War in Spain (Cambridge,
Mass., 1970), ch. 5.
35. Ibid., p.
36. Ibid., p.
37. Hugh Thomas,
The Spanish Civil War (New York, 1961), p. 436.
Ibid., p. 366.
39. As The Economist
wrote in February 1938, "Intervention by the state in industry,
as opposed to collectivization and workers' control, is reestablishing
the principle of private property." Quoted in
Broue and Temime, The Revolution and the Civil War, p. 313.
40. For a fuller
discussion of the bases of this development, see Maurice Zeitlin,
Determinants of Political Democracy in Chile," in James Petras
and Maurice Zeitlin (eds.),
Latin America: Reform or Revolution? (New York, 1968), and Victor
Wallis, "Imperialism and the 'Via Chilena'," Latin American
Perspectives, No. 2 (Summer 1974), 44-57.
41. See classification
of nationalizations in NACLA, New Chile (New York, 1973).
42. Andrew Zimbalist
and James Petras, "Workers' Control in Chile during Allende's
Presidency," Comparative Urban Research III, 3 (1975-76), pp.
43. The best
analytic account of these events is in Gabriel Smirnow, La revolucion
desarmada: Chile, 1970-1973 (Mexico, 1977).
44. Edward Boorstein,
Allende's Chile: An.Inside View (New York, 1977), p. 212.
and Petras, "Workers' Control in Chile," p. 25.
46. A striking
example would be the decentralizing implications of substituting
solar power for nuclear power, See Barry Commoner, The Poverty of
Power (New York, 1976).
47. On the significance
of Marx's emphasis on the work process, see Harry Braverman, Labor
and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century
1974), Introduction; on Marx's interest in cooperatives, see Yvon
Bourdet, "Karl Marx et
l'autogestion," Autogestion, No. 15 (1971), p.102; for Marx's
view of "leaders," see his letter to Kugelmann of April
17, 1871, in Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence
(Moscow, 1953), p. 320.
48. For a survey
of the major alternative Marxian tradition, see Dick Howard and
Karl E. Klare
(eds.), The Unknown Dimension: European Marxism since Lenin (New
49. Leval, Collectives,
Two unique descriptive
sources on revolutionary workers' control are Gaston Leval,
Collectives in the Spanish Revolution (New York, 1975) and Parts
II & III of Patricio Guzman's film The Battle of Chile, which
should be supplemented by a reading of Andrew Zimbalist and James
Petras, "Workers' Control in Chile during Allende's Presidency,"
Comparative Urban Research III, 3 (1975-76), 21-30. A fine general
survey incorporating cases up to 1968 is Daniel Guerin, Anarchism
(New York, 1970). For representative documents, see Branko Horvat
et al. (eds.), Self-Governing Socialism (New York, 1975), vol. I,
pp. 146-253. The outstanding theoretical and descriptive treatment
is Yvon Bourdet and Alain Guillerm, L'Autogestion (Paris, 1975).
A stimulating critique of self-management from a Leninist perspective
is Jean-Luc Dallemagne, Autogestion ou dictature du proletariat
(Paris, 1976). An indispensable periodical is Autogestion et Socialisme;
the only English-language periodicals approaching its coverage are
Radical America and Telos.
Russia, Maurice Brinton, The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control
(London, 1970), provides a useful account of the conflict around
self-management; as for its actual workings, the as yet largely
unpublished work of William G. Rosenberg (History Dept.,
University of Michigan) promises to give the first comprehensive
overview. Marcel Liebman,
Leninism under Lenin (London, 1975), is an exceptionally relevant
background work. On Italy in 1920, Paolo Spriano, The Occupation
of the Factories: Italy 1920 (London, 1975), is essential.
writings for the workers' newspaper Ordine Nuovo [New Order], now
available in a volume of Selectionsà1910-1920 (New York,
1977), have a significance going well beyond the immediate events.
On the Spanish revolution, the outstanding general treatment is
Pierre Broue and Emile Temime, The Revolution and the Civil War
in Spain (Cambridge, Mass.,1970). George Orwell's classic firsthand
account, Homage to Catalonia (Boston, l952), is also well worth
reading (esp. chs. V, IX). On Allende's Chile, the best historical
analysis is Gabriel Smirnow, La revolucion desarmada; Chile, 1970-1973
(Mexico, 1977), translated as The Disarmed Revolution (Monthly Review
[I have discussed
additional cases in two subsequent articles: "Workers' Control
Latin America" (sections on Peru, Chile, Cuba), Latin American
Research Review XVIII, 2
(1983), 181-189, and "Workers' Control: Cases from Latin America
and the Caribbean" (sections on Cuba, Bolivia, Grenada, Nicaragua),
in Jack W. Hopkins (ed.), Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary
Record, Vol. 3 (New York, 1985), 254-263. My discussion of Cuba
in the latter article led me to qualify my hypothesis about the
distinctive importance of the moment of "revolutionary crisis."]