

The Hegemonist Challenge to Globalism

By Jerry Harris

“Power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”
Mao Tse-tung

The Bush administration has made a sharp break with the globalist policies developed after the break-up of the Soviet Union. This ruling class rift centers on differences over whether the U.S. should act as the world's sole superpower or leader of a multilateral empire of capital. The debate has been growing for some time and Bush has built his support primarily among international hegemonists within the military/industrial class fraction (MICF). This fraction remains split among a number of influential wings, the most important being globalists and hegemonists. The globalists support a multinational approach to security, civic engagements for nation building and cross-border integration of production. The hegemonists advocate unilateral U.S. leadership, using the armed forces aggressively but only for vital national interests and a rebuilt military based on information technologies.

Globalization and the MICF

Over the past twenty years powerful transformational forces have affected capitalism creating new strategies among ruling class economic, political and military networks. Two of the most important changes were the disintegration of the USSR and the revolution in information technology. Each section of the class was affected to a different extent by these emerging opportunities and pressures. Certainly CEOs and managers of transnational corporations (TNCs) and financial institutions were the most completely transformed, their accumulation strategies totally immersed in global production and speculation. Arguments for non-globalist economic strategies are virtually non-existent inside TNCs. Political parties also saw the rise of transnational advocates to leadership, but they still contend with anti-globalist fractions inside their organizations and are subject to populist mass politics from outside.

Debates also erupted over the role of the armed forces in a post-Soviet world. When the Soviet bloc dissolved the 40-year strategic outlook and mission of the MICF also ended. Containment, nuclear confrontation and support for Third World dictatorships gave way to a new globalist strategy of world “democratization and economic liberalization.” (1) This approach began to consolidate under George Bush and then turned into a controversially full-blown globalism under Clinton. Analyzing the move away from an exclusive focus on military threats the Naval War College observed, “Human rights ...and commercial interests are used to justify maintaining and using military forces. The U.S. Army, for example, now trains for peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian operations as it once prepared to battle Warsaw Pact armies.” (2) Although the globalist strategy downplayed the threat of a major war, it pushed extensive engagement and “*enlarging*” the community of secure free-market and democratic nations.” (3) In fact, under these new policies Clinton deployed troops more often than any previous president. As General Reimer explained, the Army was a “rapid reaction force for the global village.” (4)

Charles Hasskamp from the Air War College sums-up the globalist approach nicely, “without a military threat to the nation's survival on the horizon, it is now more critical to have the capability to deter war and exercise preventive diplomacy than to have a force unable to react to anything but war. Unfortunately, there are still many who oppose having the military do anything but prepare for total war...Global security now requires efforts on the part of international governmental agencies, private

volunteer organizations, private organizations, and other instruments of power from around the world...helping to stabilize the world, promoting social and economic equity, and minimizing or containing the disastrous effects of failed states. Let us not merely pay lip service to warrior diplomacy.” (5)

Under this policy unilateralism is a dangerous self-isolating strategy. Writing for the National Defense University, Richard Kugler states that “any attempt by the United States to act unilaterally would both overstretch its resources and brand it as an unwelcome hegemonic superpower.” (6) Another study at the Army’s War College warns that “Third World perceptions that the United States wants to retain its hegemony by enforcing the status quo at all costs (will encourage) much cynicism about American ideals at home and abroad.” (7) Military strategist at both these institutes argue the strongest guarantee for world stability is multilateral civic and military engagement. As Kugler explains, “the best hope for the future is a global partnership between (the E.U. and U.S.) acting as leaders of the democratic community.” (8)

These globalist policies were never fully supported within the military, and yet no one else seemed to offer a more comprehensive or convincing vision. One alternative was even positively titled “muddling through.” (ibid, 20) Those opposed to nation building advocated less military involvement limited to traditional roles. As Samuel Huntington wrote, “A military force is fundamentally antihumanitarian: its purpose is to kill people in the most efficient way possible.” (9)

By Clinton’s last years in office many in the military felt globalization had drawn the armed forces too deeply into civilian affairs. In a precautionary prize-winning essay for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Lt. Colonel Charles Dunlap he creates a scenario in which a politicized military stages a coup in 2012. In a second essay Dunlap argues that the “armed forces (should) focus exclusively on indisputable military duties” and “not diffuse our energies away from our fundamental responsibilities for war fighting.” (10) Others, like Doug Bandow protested that “it is not right to expect 18-year-old Americans to be guardians of a de facto global empire, risking their lives when their own nation’s security is not at stake.” (11) But hegemonists faced a major problem; in their anti-globalist reaction they were caught advocating a cautious defensive position that lacked a serious superpower threat. On the otherhand, globalists put forward a dynamic and proactive engagement policy set inside a new grand strategy for capitalist global penetration and stability.

So when MICF hegemonists seized upon terrorism to redefine political and military strategy they found a solid base of support. As Rumsfeld notes “In just one year – 2001- we adopted a new defense strategy. We replaced the decade-old two-major-theater-of war construct with an approach more appropriate for the twenty-first century.” (12) This new strategy advocates extensive engagement but on the traditional grounds of warfare, not nation building humanitarianism. Hegemonists had tied themselves to a self-limiting strategy with a narrow set of interests, but terrorism provided a worldwide threat that let them out of their anti-globalist box and created the long sought post Cold War enemy. As noted by one study, “from the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 until the attacks on the heart of the American republic on September 11, 2001, the transnational progressives were on the offensive...(but) clearly, in the post-September 11 milieu there is a window of opportunity for those who favor a reaffirmation of the traditional norms of ...patriotism.” (13)

Harvey Sicherman, president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, also points to the sharp turn in policy after 9-11. “The Clinton administration believed that just as economic globalization would transcend borders, so security could be lifted out of the rut of geopolitics...this powerful idea needed as its corollary an international military force (but) globalization had begun to falter even before September 11 when the destruction of the World Trade Center ended the era. Today geopolitics is

back with a vengeance ...American military forces are waging a war today in defense of U.S. national security, not to secure the freedoms of Afghans. Humanitarian warfare is a doctrine come and gone.” (14)

Rise of the Hegemonists

The terrorist attacks created the opportunity for anti-globalists to construct a new ruling class bloc and challenge the globalists from within the MICF. The globalist base was weakest in the MICF while the military's patriotic/nationalist ideology and the national character of military manufacturing allowed the hegemonists to maintain a strong overall position and contend successfully for leadership. This acted as a catalyst for anti-globalist forces within broader circles of the ruling class whose political outlook is tied to an older imperialist model which developed in the international era of industrial production linked to a mission of world leadership and national greatness.

The hegemonist camp is composed of two major wings, the geopolitical realists and neoconservatives. Neoconservatives have advocated aggressive unilateral engagement for many years, maintain a strong ideological basis for their policy views and criticize the realists for their pragmatism. As Paul Wolfowitz, the Pentagon's number two man has stated, “nothing could be less realistic than the version of the realist view of foreign policy that dismisses human rights as an important tool of American foreign policy.” (15) For neoconservatives ideas still matter and they seek to enshrine foreign policy in the assumed superiority of Western civilization. Like imperialists of the industrial age they carry the “white man's burden” of civilizing a Hobbesian world.

Neoconservative influence can be seen in the Bush administration's support for a military solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. In part this stems from the Christian right who see Israel as a buffer for Western civilization against the Arab and Muslim challenge. Christian activists are a powerful social base for Bush and he personally identifies with the movement. But there is also a long history between neoconservatives and the U.S. Zionist movement linked by the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) and Center for Security Policy (CSP). These think tanks have been a haven for right-wing defense intellectuals, many now in influential government positions. For example, JINSA advisors include Richard Perle, head of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board, John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, Douglas Feith, third ranking executive in the Pentagon, and Vice President Cheney. In addition, another 22 CSP advisors are in key posts in the national security establishment. (16)

Many in the JINSA/CSP circle have long advocated regime change throughout the Middle East, and opposed the Oslo political process favored by globalists. Michael Ledeen, a leading JINSA member and Oliver North's Iran/contra liaison with Israel, calls for “total war” to sweep away governments throughout the region. Speaking to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Perle stated: “Those who think Iraq should not be next may want to think about Syria or Iran or Sudan or Yemen or Somalia or North Korea or Lebanon or the Palestinian Authority...if we do it right with respect to one or two...we could deliver a short message, a two-word message. ‘Your next.’ ” (17)

Although neoconservatives are influential in the White House, realists dominate the Bush cabinet. Traditionally they have been more reluctant to engage in operations considered outside vital national interests. As Bush stated in his debate with Al Gore, “I don't think we can be all things to all people in the world. I think we've got to be careful when we commit our troops. The vice president and I have a disagreement about the use of troops. He believes in nation building. I would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders. I believe the role of the military is to fight and win wars.” (18) But realists also maintain a classic imperialist vision of the nation/state achieving hegemony by

dominating a dangerous and competitive world system through political and military power. This became pronounced after 9-11 because a war to defend vital national interest was now possible. All of this is evident in the unilateralist and naked hegemonic policies of the Bush administration. The refusal to sign important international agreements, the “with us or against us” bravado and threats of preemptive military strikes are all fundamental weapons in the hegemonist arsenal. It is this approach that establishes a powerful common political bond for both hegemonist wings.

Both wings are also united in their opposition to globalist multilateralism which they feel undermines the central importance of the nation/state. Hegemonists see the key ideological divide “not between globalist and antiglobalist, but instead over the form Western global engagement should take in the coming decades: will it be transnational or internationalist?” (19) Clearly a fundamental struggle within the capitalist class is taking place that goes to different visions of U.S. society, America’s role in the world and its relationship to its most important allies. Key to hegemonist ideology is the cultural purity and political independence of the nation/state. Their rejection of multilateralism abroad is tied to their opposition to multiculturalism at home. They fear the deconstruction of an Euro-centric narrative of U.S. history will create a “post-assimilationist society” that will make “American nationhood obsolete.” (20) For hegemonists “transnationalism is the next stage of multiculturalist ideology – it is multiculturalism with a global face.” (21) The U.S. Patriot Act linked to a unilateral war against Iraq are component parts of a strategic offensive against external and internal foreign threats that globalists fail to confront.

Perle takes-up the nation-centric argument against multilateralism stating, “An alliance today is really not essential...the price you end-up paying for an alliance is collective decision making. That was a disaster in Kosovo...We’re not going to let the discussions...the manner in which we do it (and) the targets we select to be decided by a show of hands from countries whose interests cannot be identical to our own and who haven’t suffered what we have suffered.” Continuing on about an U.S. occupation of Iraq, Perle says, “look at what could be created, what could be organized, what could be made cohesive with the power and authority of the United States.” (22) For hegemonists unilateralism is more than a referred policy, independent political action is a principal pillar of their ideology and foundation of state power.

When Rumsfeld and Cheney advocated rejecting U.N. led inspections in Iraq they were defending the independence of the U.S. state. This strikes at the heart of powerful interests on both sides of the Atlantic, and centrists like Powell still advocate working within the U.N. framework. But others, like former Reagan U.N. representative Jeanne Kirkpatrick argue that “foreign governments and their leaders, and more than a few activists here at home, seek to constrain and control American power by means of elaborate multilateral processes, global arrangements and U.N. treaties that limit both our capacity to govern ourselves and act abroad.” (23) For hegemonists multilateral cooperation is weakness in a world where, from their viewpoint, competitive international blocs still constitute a major source of conflict. This conflict is given great significance because “transnational progressivism” challenges “traditional American concepts of citizenship, patriotism, assimilation, and at the most basic level, to the meaning of democracy itself.” (24) Samuel Huntington’s thesis on the “clash of civilizations” provides the theoretical basis that ties cultural wars at home to wars with Islam abroad. Western civilization must be defended within and without, something hegemonists believe globalists not only fail to do but actively undermine.

Globalist	Hegemonist
Multilateral Foreign Policy	Unilateralist Foreign Policy
Multicultural National Diversity	Euro-Centric and Christian Nation
Nation Building and “Police” Interventions	Preemptive and Preventive Warfare
A Mutual and Stable World Empire for Global Capital	Geopolitical Competition and Regional Blocs
Transnational Corporate Economic Base	Military Industry Complex
Supranational Governmental Institutions and Polycentric Diplomacy	Nation Centric State and Unipolar Leadership

From this point-of-view a U.S. war on Iraq is linked to the battle for class power against globalism. Establishing the unilateral use of force and violence, ignoring international law, attacking immigrant rights, and promoting a renewed patriotic cultural narrative are all key elements in a broad counteroffensive. John Fonte, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, offers a definition of the social base for “transnational progressivism.” Fonte includes transnational corporate executives, Western politicians, the “post-national” intelligentsia, U.N. bureaucrats, E.U. administrators and various NGOs and foundation activists. (25) This is the line of demarcation in what hegemonists see as an “intracivilization conflict” for the soul of the nation/state.

The Bush Doctrine

From the start of the Bush administration unilateralism was a key tool to undermine globalist policies. U.S. interests are held above all others because only the U.S. can promote and expand the free market, democracy and the Christian way of life. Other powers may be subjected to toxic weapons inspections, world courts and environmental treaties but the U.S. needs to stand above all these global restraints to carry out its mission as leader successfully. The goal is to rule over a world system, not participate in it as first among equals.

All this was evident in Bush’s aggressive speech to 25,000 at West Point in June, 2001. Throughout his talk the audience of future military leaders greeted the president with “shouts of approval” and “raucous applause.” (26) As Bush stated, “the only path to safety is the path of action...we must take the battle to the enemy...and confront the worst threats before they emerge.” Directing criticism at European leaders for being too morally weak to fight “evil” Bush continued, “Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree.” (27) This talk of right and wrong is tied to a Christian ideology that provides the hegemonists their particular brand of moral leadership and desire for national purity. It also merges with the neoconservative concern for ideology and Huntington’s call to defend Western civilization. As Bush further stated, “We are in a conflict between good and evil... and we will lead the world in opposing it.” “Civilized nations” fighting “chaos” should place the “safety..and peace of the planet” in the hands of the U.S.

in the battle against “mad terrorists and tyrants.” (28) For Bush only the U.S. can lead this war to success and he wants the U.S. to determine policy without interference.

With less Christian fervor Rumsfeld put forward the same doctrine in *Foreign Affairs* a month before Bush’s speech at West Point. As Rumsfeld articulates, “Our challenge in this century is...to defend our nation against the unknown, the uncertain, the unseen, and the unexpected...so we can defeat adversaries that have not yet emerged.” (29) This preemptive aggression for an endless war against non-existent enemies is repeated throughout Rumsfeld’s article. “Take the war to the enemy...the only defense is a good offense...unhindered access to space...sustain power in distant theaters...rule nothing out,”(30) Rumsfeld wants permanent war readiness as the overriding policy of the U.S. state. In Rumsfeld’s world even the shadow of a challenge is not to be tolerated. “We must develop new assets, the mere possession of which discourages adversaries from competing.” (31) In this scenario the role of global allies is to serve policy determined by the U.S. Thus “the mission must determine the coalition, the coalition must not determine the mission, or else the mission will be dumbed down to the lowest common denominator.” (32) “Dumbed down” referring not to Bush, but the political policies and strategies of everyone else.

Battles Over Industrial Strategy

The hegemonist/globalist struggle also has an economic aspect that extends to industrial strategy. The military’s industrial base is international not transnational. Transnational corporations manufacture using global assembly lines and supply chains, are engaged in cross-border merger and acquisitions, participate heavily in foreign direct investments, and their foreign held assets, sales and employment average between 45% to 65% of their corporate totals. International corporations have the majority of their investments, production facilities and employment in their country of origin and mainly access global markets through exports rather than through foreign owned affiliates. The latter pattern is evident in the defense industry that has the majority of its assets, employment and sales inside the U.S. Among the big four defense contractors Lockheed Martin has 939 facilities in 457 cities in 45 states, Northrup Grumman is located in 44 states, Boeing has 61 facilities in 26 states and Raytheon has 79 sites in 26 states. These are the majority of their global production facilities. In terms of international sales the majority are exports and run well below the average for TNCs, just 21% for Boeing and 25% for Lockheed Martin. (33)

Defense corporations also rely on state protectionism. For example, in 2001 fully 72% of Lockheed Martin’s sales came from U.S. government procurements. In fact, a whole set of laws prevent sharing technologies or accepting foreign investments in key military industries. While international sales are growing, they are mainly national exports overseen by the Departments of Defense, Commerce and State, all with their own set of rules and restrictions. Furthermore, the Pentagon processes 75% of all U.S. military foreign sales. This means the Department of Defense (DOD) negotiates the terms, collects the funds and disburses them to private U.S. contractors. The main military manufacturer’s organization, The National Defense Industrial Association, has 9,000 corporate affiliates and 26,000 individual members with no foreign membership. Divided up among these contractors is the largest single slice of the federal government’s budget. Current military spending has hit \$437 billion with \$62 billion for procurement and \$51 billion in research and development. (34)

Within this nationally protected economic base globalists are at work. Vance Coffman, Chairman and CEO of Lockheed Martin has called for open and integrated transatlantic markets in military production. (35) The powerful Atlantic Council has also advocated military industrial mergers and acquisitions between the E.U. and U.S., as well as common research and development. (36) In addition the Cato Institute, an influential conservative think tank, has called for open international

investments in military markets. (37) On the European side General Klaus Naumann, former Chief of Staff of the German Federal Armed Forces, has backed industrial coordination in production and research. (38)

Worried about Bush and “growing differences between U.S. and European policies” the Commission of Transatlantic Security and Industrial Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century was recently formed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The parent organization is chaired by former Senator Sam Nunn who oversees a \$25 million endowment and a staff of 190 researchers. Board members include Henry Kissinger, James Schlesinger, Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Writing for the International Herald Tribune the Commission’s co-chairs, French aviation CEO Jean-Paul Bechat and former U.S. ambassador Felix Rohatyn, argued that national defense regulations have been rendered “obsolete and counterproductive by the internationalization of industrial operations.” Instead they envision a “trans-Atlantic defense market (in which) any unilateral approach would be unrealistic and unwise.” This market should have a “level play field with equivalent access to each other’s markets and the abandonment of ‘national champion’ industrial policies by governments and cultural norms that amount to ‘Buy American’ or ‘Buy European’ practices.” (39)

Such calls for global production has caused a fierce debate within the MICF and overlays political differences with conflicting economic strategies. Hegemonists see a world where “allies come and go” and the need to maintain an industrial base for national security is of “paramount consideration.” As argued in one military policy paper, “US strategy cannot be based solely on economic issues...we can ill afford to export the means of our future defeat.” (40) Hegemonists don’t want military production entangled with partners they don’t fully trust, particularly E.U. governments filled with globalists, social democrats and even communists.

Military production has been protected from globalization in two important areas. Financing is protected from speculative capital swings because of guaranteed state funding, and the national market is an unchallenged monopoly. For example, Raytheon is financed by more than 4,000 military funded programs and is included in over 450 major programs in the Defense Appropriations Bill of 2002. After the demise of the Soviet Union the industry was subject to cutbacks and internal competition that led to large-scale mergers, but this centralization was not driven by global competitive pressure because the industrial base was not subject to transnationalized competition. But shrinking post-Soviet defense procurements and the inherent logic for capitalist expansion is driving MICF globalists towards building a transatlantic market and shifting to a transnational strategy. Such economic strategy also aligns with a multilateralist political agenda. This adds an important economic factor in the globalist/hegemonist struggle for power and is a major fault line inside the MICF.

The Impact of Information Technology

Lastly we can turn briefly to the impact of information technological (IT) that laid the foundation for another important change, a new military doctrine labeled the “Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).” New technology transformed the command, control, communications and reach of military organization in the same manner that information technologies transformed the organization of TNCs. As Rumsfeld has argued, “we must take the leap into the information age, which is the critical foundation of all our transformation efforts.” (41) Hegemonists believe information technology will provide an unchallenged competitive edge. As pointed out in a study at the Naval Postgraduate School, “RMA proponents argue the United States should take advantage of its current technological edge to accelerate a revolution in warfare that will sustain U.S. power and leadership into the future and that can be exploited in U.S. foreign policy to build an international system to the nation’s

liking.” (42) This is reflected in Rumsfeld’s call for a 125% increase in spending for information technology, a 145% increase in space capabilities, and a 28% increase in programs that can attack enemy information networks. In turn this means cuts to previously important programs like Peacekeeper missiles, the F-14 fighter, and the Army’s Crusader cannon.

Although microprocessors are thoroughly integrated into the production and products of the defense industry, military organizations are still debating how to expand and integrate their new weapons into warfare and organizational strategy. These weapons are designed to make use of information technologies but are tied to non-informational warfare strategies. The effort is to switch from platform-centric models of operation that rely on large individual military assets that engage targets head-to-head, to decentralized networks of smaller, faster weapon nodes that self-synchronize and engage more rapidly from all directions. This transformation parallels the period over a decade ago when corporations were tied to large individual mainframe computers and didn’t understand how to structure themselves around PCs. Only when corporations learned how to use networked productive capacities did informational capitalism take-off. They had to adopt their business strategies to their new organizational capabilities, not use the new technology with old strategies. This corporate debate was often structured around the transformation from industrial to informational capitalism.

The military faces this same debate today. As Richard Harknett points out, “the growing ubiquity of personal computers and other information technologies is viewed not only as the basis for a new societal age but as the foundation for a new form of warfare as well...the creation, accumulation, and manipulation of information has always been a central part of human activity (warfare in particular).” (43) Another study states “A particular understanding of the late twentieth-century shift from the industrial age to the information age drives the Networked Centric Warfare vision.” (44) While some question whether networked organizational methods can succeed in such a highly bureaucratic and hierarchical institution as the military growing support for RMA is evident. For example, an important Army project titled ‘Force XXI,’ states its goal “is to create the 21st century army that is ‘digitized and redesigned to harness the power of information-age warfare.’ ” (45) Support is also evident in the Navy, as another study notes, “Every Sailor and Marine has an opportunity to be a part of something significant, since transformations of this magnitude—from an industrial-age Navy to an information-age Navy—rarely occur.” (46) More importantly Rumsfeld has ordered the Pentagon to prepare battle scenarios with Iraq based on Networked Centric Warfare.

Promoters of Networked Centric Warfare (NCW) believe it will change “doctrine, platforms, training and culture.” (47) The key focus is on networked information of “unprecedented pace and intensity.” that would give officers and troops real-time “situational awareness to rule the battlespace.” (48) Just-in-time warfare could let commanders coordinate a vast system of troops and machines that rapidly respond to changing conditions to out maneuver their enemy. In adopting NCW the military looks towards “applying the lessons learned from the commercial sector...to become a ‘brain-rich organization.” (49) This IT scenario has obvious links to TNC strategies rooted in speed, creative intellectual capital and greater centralization of command.

But while some advocate “developing human capital” others see removing the “human element” and creating automated cybernetic systems to do much of the fighting. (50) This parallels corporate discussions on how to use intellectual capital to create machines that can minimize human labor and lower the cost of production. For the military IT fighting machines can minimize the cost of war with fewer U.S. casualties. Some in the military argue that “RMA with its prospect of ‘immaculate’ war-making (will) change the equation between cost and benefit, and make war more bearable in the public eye.” (51) Such political considerations are important points in the military’s long sought solution to the Vietnam syndrome of extended wars and high casualties undermining popular

support. As another study notes, “the technological and organizational innovations springing from the RMA may make US military objectives attainable at lower costs than ever before—a consideration that stands to shape US commitment to military coercion...a President able to control casualties is in a better position to maintain popular support for his own war policy (and) domestic legitimacy for military intervention.” (52)

Conclusion

The above analysis reveals the sharp contradictions under which the Bush administration must operate. Their hegemonic strategy rejects the leadership of the globalists in favor of an U.S. led process that reinforces the role of the national state through its monopoly over violence. But anti-war sentiment and globalist’s political opposition are creating enough pressures to cause the hegemonists to adopt and moderate their rhetoric and aims. Their bomb-don’t-build strategy is failing in post-Taliban Afghanistan and pushing the administration towards deeper nation building efforts. But more evident and explosive has been the visible conflict over Iraq. The globalist counter-offensive in September by Republican heavyweights Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Lawrence Eagleburger and James Baker hit the media and hegemonists with full force. In turn Cheney ran to the Veterans of Foreign Wars and Rumsfeld ordered-up an audience of Marines to urge unilateral war on Iraq. Open conflict at such elite levels is rarely seen in public, and it led to Bush going to the U.N. to seek an international consensus.

Although hegemonists believe a unilateral attack is key to asserting U.S. power, they have been forced to retreat and seek U.N. sanctions. This is the centrist position represented by Powell. The Powell doctrine for military involvement developed with Casper Wienberger during the Reagan years advocates having clear national interests, using overwhelming force, gaining public support and exhausting all diplomatic means. But one key element of the doctrine is missing for the war on Iraq, an exit strategy. This may well be because there is no exit strategy, but rather plans for permanent occupation and control of Iraq’s oil. This would mesh with hegemonist’s economic strategies of energy independence as well as threaten Russian and French inroads into Iraq’s oil industry. Hegemonists see transnational economics as a failure with crisis after crisis creating instability in Asia, Turkey and Latin America. Seizing control of the world’s second largest oil reserves puts a vital section of the world economy under greater U.S. domination. Military bases in Iraq would also provide strategic geopolitical power. All this translates into greater stability and order from the hegemonist’s viewpoint. From the globalist’s perspective it is a world ready to explode.

Redefining the U.S. relationship with Europe is also rife with contradictions. The hegemonists want the E.U. to do nation building while the U.S. does carpet-bombing. It’s a division of labor in which “Americans (are) a sort of global mercenary force and the Europeans international social workers.” (53) Hardly the type of globalism that E.U. leaders expect or desire, relegated to cleaning-up the human disaster created by U.S. bombs. As French foreign policy expert Gilles Andreani observes, “this is a new attitude, a contempt toward Europeans that we never saw before.” (54) Indeed, transnationalists on both sides of the Atlantic are deeply disturbed. The invasion of Iraq may be the first war initiated by a minority fraction of the ruling class, leaving little room for hegemonist errors or miscalculations. Whether or not the war is launched their overall strategy is a high stakes gamble that will set the stage for struggle in the U.S. and the world.

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