

The George W. Bush administration launched the most serious challenge to the transnational capitalist class since the beginning of the globalist project. To understand the nature and depth of this conflict an updated study of the military/industrial complex was needed which combined an economic and political analysis that exposed the strategic differences within the capitalist class.

THE MILITARY/INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX IN THE CONFLICT FOR POWER

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“Power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”
Mao Tse-tung

After W.W. II the U.S. had unquestioned hegemony throughout the capitalist world. But in the early 1970s U.S. power began a long decline, particularly as the economies in Europe and Japan recovered. Still, the U.S. maintained leadership by providing military security for the West. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union there was a basic shift in this arrangement. The U.S. security umbrella was no longer needed and previous American economic hegemony had long passed its peak.

Alongside this strategic change was the emerging revolution in information technology. As information capitalism became firmly rooted in all the advanced countries a system of economic and political globalization rapidly developed. These changing world conditions presented two choices to the U.S. ruling class; either fully integrate into a globalized system of world capitalism or reassert hegemony through military power. Globalization became the choice of consensus, backed by rapidly growing transnational corporations, the immense power of speculative finance, a surge in cross cultural exchanges and a technological boom that pointed to a new economy. For most leaders in the U.S. and West the Soviet collapse had created the conditions to build a new integrated multilateral system.

But beneath the new global system remained a powerful nationalist wing within the U.S. capitalist class. These elements retained a solid base of support in the military/industrial complex (MIC), the structural heart of U.S. superpower status. The hegemonists bloc consist of geopolitical realists and neoconservatives and both believe the defeat of the USSR provided the opportunity for a unilateral U.S. empire. This strategy was laid-out in a pivotal policy paper published in 1997 by the neo-conservative think tank Project for the New American Century, and signed onto by Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney and other top White House officials.

As the paper reads, “Having led the West to victory America faces an opportunity and a challenge...Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests? What is required is a military that is strong...a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United State’s global responsibilities...At present the United States faces no global rival. America’s grand strategy should aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible (and maintain) unquestioned U.S. military preeminence (to prevent) others an opportunity to shape the world in ways antithetical to American interests.” (Donnelly, 1997, i)

This vision drives the Bush administration and is a sharp challenge to the globalist strategy followed throughout the 1990s. This conflict for power between the globalist and hegemonist wings of the U.S. capitalism is key to understanding the current world and stems from the undermining of the old nation/state by globalization. A world economy based on global assembly lines and run by transnational capitalists has outgrown the use of nationalist armies protecting and extending national markets. Security was redefined as global stability to facilitate cross border investments. As pointed out by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, “Almost everywhere, countries face the task of harmonizing their foreign economic policies with their national security strategies. China and Russia both face this challenge, as do the Europeans and the Japanese. So does the United States.” (Kugler, 2000a, 8)

To understand the nature of this conflict let me begin by suggesting the capitalist class consist of different networks of power and interests. These

would include economic networks of productive and finance capital; political networks that dominate the state apparatus, intellectual circles and the leading political parties; cultural networks that include media, academic and religious forces; and the military/industrial complex (MIC). These networks are interconnected and overlap but are also internally divided into various fractions, the most important consisting of globalist and nationalist interests. Fractions in the different networks can link together around common economic, political, cultural and ideological concerns and coalesce into defined wings of the capitalist class that attempt to build a broad based hegemonic ruling political bloc.

Based upon this approach the MIC exists as a separate and independent network split among a number of different influential fractions. The most important division is between transnational globalists and international hegemonists. The globalists support strategic coordination with global allies in the North and South, humanitarian warfare and nation building to establish stability in countries not fully integrated into the global system, and industrial and technological mergers with allied defense manufacturers. In contrast, international hegemonists promote unilateral world leadership, unquestioned military preeminence, preemptive warfare, a protected industrial base and a rebuilt military using new information technologies.

In the following charts we can begin to trace tensions between economic and security interests within the U.S. ruling class.

U.S. INVESTMENT IN COUNTRIES

OF KEY MILITARY ALLIES, 1998.

# US owned affiliates	Assets (in millions)	# of workers (in thousands)	Compensation (in millions)	Affiliate net income (in millions)
Taiwan 240	23,611	69.4	1,495	867
S. Korea 235	20,139	57.7	1,553	57
Philippines 147	9,755	70.9	562	633
Turkey 114	6,361	37.7	668	364
Israeli 110	11,483	53.5	1,329	621
Pakistan 34	1,824	8.1	57	-114

U.S. INVESTMENTS IN COUNTRIES WITH MINIMUM U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT, 1998.

# of US foreign affiliates	Assets (in millions)	# of Workers (in thousands)	Compensation (in millions)	Affiliate Net Income (in millions)
China (with Hong Kong) 944	83,524	311.9	4,699	3,597
Singapore 484	58,201	112.0	3,052	3,038
Bermuda 329	114,556	4.8	296	8,374
Argentina 325	42,002	106.9	2,751	775
Malaysia 231	20,139	128.1	1,151	-12

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA News Release, "International Investment Position in the US 2000.")

How do we interpret economic and military concerns that appear at odds with each other? The dichotomy is significantly different from industrial age imperialism when empires maintained both economic and military monopolies over territorial markets. Even after 1945 Cold War containment policies restricted investments in countries with outspoken nationalist governments such as China and Malaysia.

Clearly corporate and financial powers have led the process of globalization. They built banking and tax havens such as Bermuda, pushed integration into China and entered any world market that offered opportunities to profit. Globalism is most consolidated within this class network. Since globalists are mainly concerned with achieving stability for the expansion of capitalist markets this can explain Clinton's use of the military in Haiti, Somalia and Kosovo where there were no vital U.S. economic interests. Instead the general interest of global stability were at stake. As General Reimer once put it, the Army has become a "rapid reaction force for the global village." (Hasskamp, 1998, 17)

But hegemonist inside the MIC are at the opposite end of the scale from the economic globalists, and its inside the military where the globalist base is the weakest. Here the military's patriotic/nationalist ideology and the national character of the arms industry strengthens the position of the hegemonists in their battle for leadership. For hegemonists issues of security are tied to a model of national industrial production linked to a mission of global political preeminence over a world of competitive power blocs.

Perhaps the best example of this strategic difference is U.S. policy towards China. Globalists have made China the number one destination for foreign investments and see it as the biggest market of the 21st century. At the same time hegemonists advocate military containment fearing China will become their next great global rival. So while investments continue to accumulate the U.S. also continues to ring China with bases in Taiwan, South Korea and other Asian outposts. As the Center for Studies of Chinese Military Affairs at the National Defense University argues, "with a harder U.S. line ... China would quickly discover the boundaries of acceptable behavior...and realize that it cannot undermine U.S. interests around the world with impunity." (Marti, 2001, 4) Neoconservative Robert Kagan underlines this strategic orientation writing, "concern about China was one of the driving forces behind the demand for the technological modernization of

the American military...and in a broad sense it has already become an organizing principle of American strategic planning.” (Kagan, 2003, 93) These fundamental differences over such a strategic country as China expose just how deep the hegemonist/globalist split runs.

Such questions, centered on whether the military should promote globalists or U.S. interests, has become an ongoing debate within the military/industrial network. Since the 1980s MIC globalists have gained influence and allied with transnationalists both inside and outside the U.S. But their project was contested by a counter hegemonist strategy that consolidated itself in opposition to globalism and ultimately came to set policy for the Bush White House. In an article on the development of the transnational capitalist class (TCC) William Robinson and I wrote that the “national/transnational axis cuts across money, commercial and production capital, such that all three are split internally along the axis.” (Robinson/Harris, 2000, 25) The military/industrial complex should be included in our analysis because it too is split along the same axis. The difference being MIC globalists have never consolidated their internal leadership and still contend with hegemonists. Leadership in the White House can help promote one or the other MIC fraction, but in turn these fractions influence strategy from their own perspective and position.

CHARACTER OF THE MIC

To understand the military/industrial complex we need to investigate its component parts through which we can analyze the globalist/hegemonist split. We begin with their economic base. The military industry is international not transnational. Transnational corporations manufacture using global assembly lines and supply chains, are engaged in cross-border merger and acquisitions, participate heavily in foreign direct investments, and their foreign held assets, sales and employment average between 45% to 65% of their corporate totals. International corporations have the majority of their investments, production facilities and employment in their country of origin and mainly access global markets through exports rather than through foreign owned affiliates.

A nationally based production system is evident in the defense industry because it has the majority of its assets, employment and sales

inside the U.S. Among the big four defense contractors Lockheed Martin has 939 facilities in 457 cities in 45 states, Northrop Grumman is located in 44 states, Boeing has 62 facilities in 27 states and Raytheon has 79 sites in 26 states. These are the majority of their production facilities. In terms of international sales the majority are exports and run well below the average for transnational corporations just 21% for Boeing and 25% for Lockheed Martin. (Harris, 2002)

International corporations also rely on state protectionism. As Robinson and I have pointed out these corporations are surrounded by a “whole set of traditional national regulatory and protectionist mechanisms.”(Robinson/Harris, 2000, 23) This describes the relationship of the government to the defense industry. For example, in 2001 fully 72% of Lockheed Martin’s sales came from U.S. government procurements. In fact, a whole set of laws prevent sharing technologies or accepting foreign investments in key military industries. While international sales are growing, they are mainly national exports overseen by the Departments of Defense, Commerce and State, all with their own set of rules and restrictions. Furthermore, the Pentagon processes 75% of all U.S. military foreign sales. This means the Department of Defense (DOD) negotiates the terms, collects the funds and disburses them to U.S. contractors.

Military production has also been protected from globalization in two important areas. Financing is protected from speculative capital swings because of guaranteed state funding, and the national market is an unchallenged monopoly. For example, Raytheon is financed by more than 4,000 military funded programs and is included in over 450 major programs in the Defense Appropriations Bill of 2002. With the War on Terrorism defense contractors are now adopting military hardware for internal security use deepening the national character of their market. This market and financing is essentially untouched by global competition.

The nationalist character of production is clearly reflected in the most important military manufacturer’s organization, The National Defense Industrial Association has 9,000 corporate affiliates and 26,000 individual members with no foreign membership. The Association maintains close coordination with the DOD functioning through 34 committees, each with direct access and a working relationship with the military. Divided up among these contractors is the largest single slice of

the federal government's budget. Current military spending has hit \$383 billion with \$62 billion for procurement and \$51 billion in research and development.

The industry also has powerful political influence. At the Republican National Convention of 2000 Lockheed's vice president for corporate strategy and development boasted that he "wrote the Republican Party's foreign policy platform." (Gagon) Key government appointments of Lockheed Martin officials include Otto Reich, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs; Norm Minetta, Secretary of Transportation; Stephen Hadley, Deputy Director of the National Security Council and Albert Smith in charge of all military/space acquisitions for the Air Force. (Multinational Monitor, 2001) From Northrop Grumman comes James Roche the Secretary of the Air Force and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, a long time member of the Grumman advisory board. In addition to the above, another 26 Bush appointees come directly from the arms industry. Northrop Grumman also host a political web site titled "Capital Source" as well as financing a think tank called the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center.

Since the end of the cold war the industry has gone through a series of mergers and acquisitions leaving four dominant corporations. Boeing acquired McDonnell Douglas and Rockwell, Lockheed merged with Martin Marietta and acquired Loral and Unisys, Raytheon bought out Hughes and Northrop merged with Gumman and acquired Litton as well as TRW. But this centralization was not driven by global competitive pressure because the industrial base was not subject to transnationalized competition. Immersed in a protected national environment military manufacturers did not transform themselves towards a transnational model. Rather military cuts that averaged \$40 billion a year during the first part of the Clinton administration drove the mergers as a response to economic survival. But shrinking defense procurements also resulted in new thinking among military industrialists creating a globalist outlook and calls for a transatlantic market. Such a model of global arms manufacturing also aligned with Clinton's multilateralist political agenda and the globalist's redefinition of the military's mission.

This economic globalist strategy was given voice by Vance Coffman, Chairman and CEO of Lockheed Martin, who called for a

world market in military production. As he stated, “I envision a future transatlantic marketplace that is integrated, open and competitive...a marketplace where firms from Europe and America would cooperate and compete on an equal footing.” (Coffman, 2000) The powerful Atlantic Council has also advocated military industrial mergers and acquisitions between the E.U. and U.S., common research and development, even integrating “the planning process by including the participation of foreign firms in programs as part of an overhaul of the Department of Defense acquisition process.” (Macomber, 1998, 11)

Worried about Bush and “growing differences between U.S. and European policies” the Commission of Transatlantic Security and Industrial Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century was formed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The parent organization is chaired by former Senator Sam Nunn who oversees a \$25 million endowment and a staff of 190 researches. Board members include Henry Kissinger, James Schlesinger, Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Writing for the International Herald Tribune the Commission’s co-chairs, French aviation CEO Jean-Paul Bechat and former U.S. ambassador Felix Rohatyn, argued that national defense regulations have been rendered “obsolete and counterproductive by the internationalization of industrial operations.” Instead they envision a “trans-Atlantic defense market (in which) any unilateral approach would be unrealistic and unwise.” This market should have a “level play field with equivalent access to each other’s markets, the abandonment of ‘national champion’ industrial policies by governments and cultural norms that amount to ‘buy American’ or ‘buy European’ practices.” (Bechat, 2002, 19)

Such calls for global production have fired a debate within the MIC. Hegemonists see a world where “allies come and go” and the need to maintain an industrial base for national security is of “paramount consideration.” As argued by Lt. Colonel Wayne Johnson “US strategy cannot be based solely on economic issues...we can ill afford to export the means of our future defeat.” (Johnson, 1998, 20, 22) MIC hegemonists don’t want military production entangled with partners they don’t fully trust, particularly E.U. governments filled with globalists, social democrats, greens and communists.

SPLITS OVER POLITICAL/MILITARY STRATEGY

In terms of the MIC's intellectual life there is a large circle of academics situated in private think tanks, governmental strategic studies institutes, war colleges and various universities. These circles have vigorous debates and an intellectual life largely separated from other academic networks. They maintain a wide array of journals, web sites, policy papers, seminars and conferences with a deep pool of researchers and writers. For just one example we can look at the Air Force which in 1992 established the Institute for National Security Studies adding it to a host of existing military think tanks. Over the next six years the new Institute conducted 400 projects involving 700 researchers and over 30 universities. Among the most important research institutes are the National Strategic Studies Institute at the National Defense University (NDU), the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army's War College, the Strategic Research Department Center for Naval Warfare Studies, and the Air War College.

Charles Hasskamp of the Air War College articulates the globalist position when he argues "it is now more critical to have the capability to deter war and exercise preventive diplomacy than to have a force unable to react to anything but war. Unfortunately, there are still many who oppose having the military do anything but prepare for total war...Global security now requires efforts on the part of international governmental agencies, private volunteer organizations, private organizations, and other instruments of power from around the world...helping to stabilize the world, promoting social and economic equity, and minimizing or containing the disastrous effects of failed states." (Hasskamp, 1998, 31-32)

Globalist strategy is based on a multilateral approach which includes about half the world's countries. In a policy paper for The Globalization Project, co-sponsored by the NDU and Navy, Richard Kugler outlines a world not divided by superpowers or regional blocs, but a strategic community that shares "multilateral institutions in politics, economics, and security...few show any sign of lingering ultra-nationalism or imperialism...any lingering fear of war among them is fading into history...economic competition, moreover, tends to be mutually profitable...and (they) have the luxury of shaping their foreign policies with community-building, economic gain and related priorities in

mind...this democratic community is a readily identifiable strategic cluster.” (Kugler,2001b, 10)

This globalist approach is also evident at the Army's War College where they defined a strategic community of “stakeholders” that not only includes the E.U. and many third world partners but also potential rivals such as China, Russia and India. For military globalists security goes beyond the war machine to a broader application of power. As one paper argues, “The political and socio-cultural elements would help create conditions for long-term peace and stability by strengthening democratic institutions worldwide, by advancing human rights, and by responding to humanitarian crisis.” (Wass de Czege, 2001, 14)

Under this policy unilateralism is a dangerous self-isolating strategy. Writing for the NDU Kugler states that “any attempt by the United States to act unilaterally would both overstretch its resources and brand it an unwelcome hegemonic superpower.” (Kugler, 2000a, 23) Another study at the Army’s War College warns that “Third World perceptions that the United States wants to retain its hegemony by enforcing the status quo at all costs (will encourage) much cynicism about American ideals at home and abroad.” (Crane, 2002, 24) Military strategists at both these institutes argued the strongest guarantee for world stability is multilateral civic and military engagement. As Kugler explains, “the best hope for the future is a global partnership between (the E.U. and U.S.) acting as leaders of the democratic community.” (Kugler, 2000c, 19)

This globalist strategy was strongly promoted during the Clinton years but never fully supported within the military. Nevertheless hegemonists lacked a strategic rival enemy to focus their thinking and goals. While globalists put forward a dynamic and proactive engagement policy set inside a new grand strategy for global capitalist penetration and stability, hegemonists opposed nation building as going beyond the traditional military role and involved with non-essential global interests. As one military strategist argued, the “armed forces (should) focus exclusively on indisputable military duties” and “not diffuse our energies away from our fundamental responsibilities for war fighting.” (Dunlap, 1996, 6) In more blunt terms Samuel Huntington wrote, “A military force is fundamentally antihumanitarian: its purpose is to kill people in the most efficient way possible.” (Huntington, 1993a, 43)

Maintaining this correct use of the military was central to the argument put forward by geopolitical realists like Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice. As Rice explained before 9-11; “The president must remember that the military is a special instrument. It is lethal and it is meant to be. It is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not designed to build a civilian society.” (Harding, 2003)

This opposition to globalism backed the hegemonists into a cautious defensive position that called for less foreign intervention limited only to regions of vital interests. This dilemma was evident in the presidential debates between George W. Bush and Al Gore. As Bush stated: “I think we've got to be careful when we commit our troops. The vice president and I have a disagreement about the use of troops. He believes in nation building. I would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders. I believe the role of the military is to fight and win wars.” (Desch, 2001, 5)

The hegemonist aversion to nation building can still be seen in their failure to sufficiently support the new government in Afghanistan and the many problems of occupation in Iraq. The Bush administration was obviously unprepared and illequiped for the post war situations. Just how unprepared the military was for nation building is explained by Adam Siegel, senior analyst at Northrop Grumman, “The war fighting mission does not require analysis of governmental corruption, police brutality, organized crime...international development funding (and) what is happening in the local economy.” But under globalist leadership such questions were affecting military operations. As Siegel continues, “What will be the population's voting patterns? Where will refugees try to rebuild houses? Will the local schools open on time...These are real examples that this author has seen Brigade commanders ask their intelligence officers in Haiti and Bosnia.” (Siegel, 2001, 8) Avoiding such situations and limiting armed interventions to warfare was a key principal for the hegemonists.

These policy positions dominated MIC debates until the terrorist attacks on 9/11 provided a new worldwide threat that let hegemonists out of their anti-globalist box and created the long sought post Cold War enemy. This made hegemonist's strategy operational, with the best-

articulated position provided by the neoconservatives and their vision of an aggressive U.S. empire. They quickly moved to assert their leadership and a new unilateralist direction. Richard Perle clearly articulates their approach, “An alliance today is really not essential...the price you end-up paying for an alliance is collective decision making... We’re not going to let the discussions...the manner in which we do it (and) the targets we select to be decided by a show of hands from countries whose interests cannot be identical to our own.” (Perle, 2001)

For hegemonists such policy is a principle of independent political action and a foundation for nation-centric state power. Former U.N. representative Jeanne Kirkpatrick expresses a common neoconservative complaint that, “foreign governments and their leaders, and more than a few activists here at home, seek to constrain and control American power by means of elaborate multilateral processes, global arrangements and U.N. treaties that limit both our capacity to govern ourselves and act abroad.” (Kirkpatrick, 2000) Thus freeing the U.S. from U.N. obligations and multilateral agreements was the path to preeminent power.

Donald Rumsfeld extends this doctrine in *Foreign Affairs*. Using terrorism as a political wedge Rumsfeld stated, “Our challenge in this century is...to defend our nation against the unknown, the uncertain, the unseen, and the unexpected...so we can defeat adversaries that have not yet emerged.” (Rumsfeld, 2002, 23) This preemptive aggression for an endless war against non-existent enemies opens the door to unending military intervention. In his scenario the role of global allies is to serve policy determined by the U.S. Thus “the mission must determine the coalition, the coalition must not determine the mission, or else the mission will be dumbed down to the lowest common denominator.” (Rumsfeld, 31) “Dumbed down” referring not to Bush, but the political policies and strategies of everyone else.

Geopolitical realists were also quick to argue for a rejection of globalization and a return to hegemonist military traditions. As Harvey Sicherman, president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute stated, “The Clinton administration believed that just as economic globalization would transcend borders, so security could be lifted out of the rut of geopolitics...this powerful idea needed as its corollary an international military force (but) globalization had begun to falter even before September 11 when the destruction of the World Trade Center ended the era. Today

geopolitics is back with a vengeance...American military forces are waging a war today in defense of U.S. national security, not to secure the freedom of Afghans. Humanitarian warfare is a doctrine come and gone.” (Sicherman, 2002, 2)

Common opposition to globalist’s strategy by neoconservatives and geopolitical realists created the foundation for the Bush coalition. Although neoconservatives place greater emphasis on the civilizing mission of the West while realists focus more on military security, what united these two ideological currents into a cohesive hegemonist alliance was the aggressive projection of U.S. power in the pursuit of unilateral American interests. Their outlook is based on a common view that sees the world divided into competitive regional blocs driven by nationalist concerns where coalitions are based on temporary self-interests not long-term mutual goals. In such a Hobbesian world the U.S. must achieve military preeminence to protect its strategic interests, and therefore the institutional structure for power becomes the MIC. But this alliance needs a broader popular base to consolidate as a ruling political bloc and so the fear of terrorism, patriotic narratives and national chauvinism are used to create widespread internal support for their policies.

Although neoconservatives emphasize the importance of Western political ideology their calculated use of power is similar to the viewpoint of geopolitical realists. This fundamental common direction is clear in the following two statements. As the neoconservative Project for the New American Century argues; “the United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein. (The need for bases) would endure even should Saddam pass from the scene...and even should U.S.- Iranian relations improve...because of longstanding American interests in the region.” (Donnelly, 1997, 4) This aligns nicely with the thinking of Dr. Rice who states; “To be sure, there is nothing wrong doing something that benefits all humanity, but that is, in a sense, a second-order effect. America’s pursuit of the national interest will create conditions that promote freedom, markets and peace.” (Harding, 2003) Democracy for Iraq is of no real concern in either of these statements, rather U.S. unilateral needs are front and center while freedom and peace become “second-order effects.”

Here it is worthwhile to take a short look at hegemonist strategy for the Middle East because this region occupies such a key position in world affairs. Speaking to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Perle unwraps the strategy: “Those who think Iraq should not be next may want to think about Syria or Iran or Sudan or Yemen or Somalia or North Korea or Lebanon or the Palestinian Authority...if we do it right with respect to one or two...we could deliver a short message, a two-word message. ‘Your next.’ ” Continuing on about an U.S. occupation of Iraq, Perle boasts, “look at what could be created, what could be organized, what could be made cohesive with the power and authority of the United States.” (Perle, 2001)

Thus domination of the Middle East is the opening battle for what hegemonists see as their end game, unquestioned U.S. military preeminence in every corner of the world. This policy, which so fundamentally rejects multilateralism, has galvanized international globalist opposition. The focus of this struggle has taken place at the U.N. for all the world to see, and no clear-cut victory has emerged for either side. The split is also evident in the 2004 presidential race with General Wesley Clark clearly emerging as a representative of the MIC globalists. Within this framework the political struggle over Iraq has become the first fully engaged battle between the transnationalists and hegemonists wings of the capitalist class.

Hegemonists and Cultural Conflicts

The hegemonists also give importance to the cultural wars. The neoconservatives in particular seek to enshrine foreign policy in the superiority of Western civilization. Just as industrial era imperialist spoke of the “white man's burden” and civilizing the barbarian world the neoconservatives now use the rhetoric of democracy and freedom to cloak the same racist intent. Its on this ideological field that the neoconservatives meet the Christian right and appeal to Bush's fundamentalist religious beliefs. The Euro-centric narrative of U.S. history with its Western cultural purity is a key element in defining and defending the nation state. The rejection of multilateralism abroad is tied to the opposition of multiculturalism at home. Hegemonists fear the deconstruction of an Euro-centric narrative will create a “post-

assimilationist society” that will make “American nationhood obsolete.” For hegemonists “transnationalism is the next stage of multiculturalist ideology – its multiculturalism with a global face (and challenges) traditional American concepts of citizenship, patriotism, assimilation, and at the most basic level, to the meaning of democracy itself” (Fonte, 2001, 454/456) The U.S. Patriot Act, attacks on affirmative action and a unilateral war on Iraq are component parts of a strategic offensive against external and internal foreign threats. Western civilization must be defended within and without, something the hegemonists believe globalists not only fail to do but actively undermine. Samuel Huntington’s thesis on the “clash of civilizations” provides the theoretical basis that ties cultural wars at home to wars with Islam abroad. For Huntington Western core values are the Christian family, the free market, and individual rights. As he writes, “Faith and family, blood and belief, are what people identify with and what they will fight and die for.” (Huntington, 1993b, 7)

This was clear from the start of the Bush administration. Hegemonists defined a special role for the U.S. as defender of Western civilization. From their viewpoint U.S. interests are above all others because only the U.S. has the strength to expand free markets and democracy. Other powers may be subject to toxic weapons inspections, world courts, and environmental treaties but the U.S. needs to be free of these global restraints to insure security and fight those outside the family of civilized nations.

All this could be seen in Bush's keynote speech to 25,000 at West Point in June, 2001. Throughout his talk the audience of future military leaders greeted the president with “shouts of approval” and “raucous applause.” As Bush stated, “The only path to safety is the path of action...we must take the battle to the enemy and confront the worst threats before they emerge.” Directing criticism at European globalists for being too weak to fight Bush continued, “Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree. We are in a conflict between good and evil...and we will lead the world in opposing it.” This talk of good and evil is tied to his Christian ideology providing religious and moral justification for attacks on “uncivilized” governments. As the president continued, “Civilized nations” fighting “chaos” should place the “safety and peace of the planet” in the hands of the U.S. in this battle against “mad terrorists and

tyrants.” (Kemper, 2002) Indeed Bush is “burden” with a civilizing mission at home and abroad driven by religious and moral imperatives.

Following is a chart of strategic differences between globalists and hegemonists.

<u>Globalist</u>	<u>Hegemonist</u>
Multilateral Foreign Policy and Soft Power	Unilateralists Foreign Policy and Hard Power
Multicultural National Diversity	Euro-Centric and Christian Nation
Nation Building and Humanitarian Warfare	Preemptive and Preventive Military Warfare
A Mutual and Stable Global Empire for World Capital	Geopolitical Competition, Strategic Rivals and Regional Blocs
Transnational Corporate Economic Base	Military Industry Complex
Supranational Governmental Institutions	Nation Centric State

Military Strategy and Technology

Lastly we can turn to the importance of technology in the strategy for global conquest. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is key to hegemonist strategic aims because an extended empire is virtually impossible under the physical constraints of traditional military organization. Establishing a strong presence in countries extending from the African Horn to Indonesia, with the spread of possible armed conflicts, would simply over tax U.S. military manpower if these occupations were carried out under the “overwhelming force” doctrine of Colin Powell. This doctrine argues that the U.S. should only engaged when its vital interests are at stake and do so with such overwhelming initial force that resistance would quickly prove futile. It has widespread support inside the Pentagon because this approach protects big weapon systems, large troop size, and the budgets and careers of numerous top officers while providing a job base in many congressional districts.

But under the preemptive doctrine favored by Vice President Cheney and Rumsfeld RMA makes military preeminence achievable because it creates a hightech military composed of smaller forces with the speed and flexibility to roam the world. Less troops with advanced equipment bring the political and economic costs to an acceptable level at home, while the effectiveness of Special Forces and precision weapons are suppose to lower the social and political costs of occupation. As one study notes, “the technological and organizational innovations springing from the RMA may make US military objectives attainable at lower costs than ever before—a consideration that stands to shape US commitment to military coercion... a President able to control casualties is in a better position to maintain popular support for his own war policy (and) domestic legitimacy for military intervention.” (Nincic, 1995 10)).

Thus the overall importance of this technological revolution cannot be overstated. Its the key that makes hegemonist strategy operational. As pointed out by the Naval Postgraduate School, “RMA proponents argue the United States should take advantage of its current technological edge to accelerate a revolution in warfare that will sustain U.S. power and leadership into the future and can be exploited in U.S. foreign policy to build an international system to the nation’s liking.” (JCISS 1999)

These two doctrines, RMA and overwhelming force, with all their strategic political and economic implications have caused the swirling controversies that have swept through the halls of the Pentagon over the invasion of Iraq. Iraq was to be a showcase cementing new IT military theories, consolidating hegemonists/RMA leadership inside the Department of Defense and opening the door for further expansion. While the war was a significant step towards these aims the debates are far from over. During the first days of the war there was much criticism over the difficulty of defending the long supply lines running through the Iraq desert and the need for more troops. As the Republican Guard failed to make a successful defense of Baghdad hegemonists claimed victory for their new doctrine. But the failure of the U.S. to stop looting, the inability to rebuild the infrastructure, and the growing numbers of dead and wounded quickly reignited the debate over lack of troop strength and the need for allies. The reluctance to share any decision making powers with the U.N. and the insistence by Rumsfeld that 150,000 American troops are sufficient to maintain occupational control is directly tied to the hegemonist doctrine of warfare and unilateralism. Any retreat from these positions are understood as political defeats with strategic implications for their long term vision.

The billions spent on new RMA programs also furthers hegemonist influence within the military/industrial economic base. With a stock market in decline and stagnating production government spending accounted for almost 25% of anticipated GDP growth in 2003. Most of this jolt came through the nearly \$400 billion defense budget and homeland security spending spree. This money was put into key areas of the economy that were hard hit in the stock market crash including aerospace, telecommunications, hightech electronics and information technologies.

This spending also extends hegemonist influence to the information technology corporate sector. Between 2002 to 2007 the Bush administration plans to spend \$136 billion for new military technologies. Rumsfeld called for a 125% increase in funding for information technology, a 145% increase in space capabilities, and a 28% increase in programs that can attack enemy information networks. Military corporations that focus on high-tech weapons are seeing their stocks

jump. Raytheon is up 30%, Northrop Grumman by 72%, and TRW stocks rose 75%.

The hegemonist approach to information technology centers on military power not economic globalization. As one study points out, “the growing ubiquity of personal computers and other information technologies is viewed not only as the basis for a new societal age but as the foundation for a new form of warfare as well.” (Harknett, 1996, 2) While some question whether networked organizational methods can succeed in such a highly bureaucratic and hierarchical institution as the military support for RMA is evident. An important Army project titled ‘Force XXI,’ states its goal “is to create the 21st century army that is ‘digitized and redesigned to harness the power of information-age warfare.’ ” (Harknett 10) Support is also evident in the Navy, as another study notes, “ Every Sailor and Marine has an opportunity to be a part of something significant, since transformations of this magnitude—from an industrial-age Navy to an information-age Navy—rarely occur.” (Kasten, 2000, 13) This transformation plays a key role in the hegemonist's economic strategy for the MIC and is correlated with their desire to maintain national control over cutting edge technologies.

CONCLUSION

Military influence in industrial, state, intellectual and cultural circles creates a powerful basis for an independent MIC network. Because of its unique private/state symbiotic relationship the MIC cannot be subsumed solely into commercial or production capital or within the state sector. Furthermore because of the nationalist nature of its economic production and deeply embedded patriotic culture and ideology the MIC provides a uniquely solid base for the hegemonist political current. It's around this core that other anti-globalist forces have been able to rally and build a political bloc to challenge the TCC.

John Fonte, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, puts the strategic conflict for power between the globalists and hegemonists in clear terms. Hegemonists see the key divide “not between globalist and antiglobalist, but instead over the form Western global engagement should take in the coming decades: will it be transnational or internationalist?” (Fonte, 2001, 457) Reasserting the nation/state's right to the unilateral use of force and violence, ignoring international law, attacking immigrant rights, and promoting a

renewed patriotic cultural narrative are all key elements in a broad counteroffensive against the transnational capitalist class. Fonte's definition of the social-base for "transnational progressivism" closely parallels the class analysis of Robinson and Harris. Fonte includes corporate executives, Western politicians, the "post-national" intelligentsia, U.N. bureaucrats, E.U. administrators and various NGOs and foundation activists. (2001, 457) This is the line of demarcation for hegemonists who see an "intracivilization conflict" for the soul of the nation/state.

Far from a solid hold on power the hegemonist bloc faces a host of problems. Their unilateralist strategy is highly contested from within the ruling class and from broad sectors of the world's population. We are at a point in which both the old nation-centric state and the emerging transnational state are faced by considerable contradictions and instability. Both globalist and hegemonist political regimes have developed sharply differ responses to the crisis of world capitalist economic stagnation. Their conflict creates an unstable and dangerous crisis set within a deeper pool of contradictions arising out of economic competition, overproduction and environmental destruction. Given the economic difficulties faced by the globalists, starting with the 1997 crisis in Asia and leading to the stock market crash in 2001, it is not surprising that a political challenge advocating stability through military force would arise from within the capitalist class. The war on Iraq was but the first contested focal point in a strategic battle for class power. But the implications go beyond the immediate suffering and devastation Iraq has faced. At stake is the nature and rule of the international system.

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